ESTABLISHING CIVIL CONTROL: RULE OF LAW PLANNING IN FUTURE OPERATIONS
The rule of law is the cornerstone for all other elements of democracy. A free and fair political system, protection of human rights, a vibrant civil society, public confidence in the police and the courts, and economic development all depend upon accountable governments, fair and accessible application of the law, and respect for international human rights standards. In post-conflict settings, reestablishing the rule of law is the first step in the rebuilding process. Establishing peace and security and rebuilding justice institutions can help to develop the necessary climate for reconciliation, public confidence, and subsequent economic growth.
USAID on Democracy and Governance
American political and military leaders at the onset of combat operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq did not fully foresee the capital costs or political complexities implied by the nation-building responsibilities that would certainly follow. 2 A key aspect of the post-conflict environment characteristic in both operations was the immense challenge of reestablishing security, of all types, before other reconstruction efforts could reasonably begin. 3 Subsequent lessons learned reports and studies continue to document how the military, and its interagency and coalition partners, refine and improve the critical governmental functions that contribute to civil security, civil control and rule of law. This paper seeks to address how the previous decade's experience of security sector and justice sector reform 4 can be applied in pre and post conflict stability operations. US national security interest is often at stake as the growing number of fragile and failing states struggle to maintain legitimacy, build capacity, and create governance resilience. Security and justice sector reform capacity within the US government faces serious policy and resourcing barriers to a comprehensive response capability that adequately services the risk. Rule of law reform capacity is critical to future national security policy as a means by which the full effort of the interagency, including DoD, can be leveraged to assist nations establish critical civil control functions of governance that serve to facilitate the reform of all other sectors. The application of this directive is by no means a simple doctrinal change. At the same time, it is a timely substantiation that the -lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend, have blurred and no longer conform to the clear delineations we once knew.‖ 6 It reaffirms that the application of soft power, whether the military is in a primary or supporting role, must be equally considered part and parcel to the threat or use of force through the hard power apparatus. Success in both Stability and COIN operations, particularly when considered in the larger context of the post-conflict nation building missions of both operations, is universally predicated on one unifying principal. In all cases the important soft power tasks of reforming or rebuilding the economic and governance sectors of a state are best done so within a security environment that is permissive to these efforts.
While the US military can do much to establish and enforce security in these operations, long term security is best performed by a country's own indigenous security forces. 7 Legitimate, effective civil security and control cannot endure without the presence of laws and the ability to apply them. Functional, effective rule of law institutions of government, operating inside an established security environment, form the foundation for progress across all sectors of reform. 8 Why Rule of Law?
Strategic considerations for fragile, failing, or post-conflict states must include viable rule of law principles as a precursor to long term stability. Effective rule of law systems help to ensure public safety and legitimize the government, and can be a determinant factor in the decisions of international development entities to invest resources in the country. 9 In this regard, rule of law capacity building is a viable defense policy initiative with equal applicability and strategic value during Phase Zero, disaster relief, pre-hostility or post-conflict stability operations.
One of the problems with the conceptualization of rule of law in early international development and reconstruction efforts was the lack of a unified definition. US forces were directly involved in establishing rule of law since the Spanish American War, and were heavily involved in Germany and Japan at the end of WWII.
These early efforts can best be characterized by policies that centered on replacing constitutional laws and reorganizing criminal justice systems to resemble the American system. 15 They were designed to replace local systems with American equivalents thought to be superior, and based on US democratic ideals thought to be universally foreign police services. 20 Separate programs also exist within the agencies that address courts and legal reforms, anti-corruption policies, border security, counter-narcotics and others.
By attempting to prohibit US police assistance programs over 25 years ago, the Foreign Assistance Act has instead created a disjointed, decentralized system of agencies across the Departments operating underfunded programs that, even when considered in toto, fall significantly short of the capability required. It is this lack of capacity that critics continuously point to with regard to the systemic failures of the US government's efforts. The disjointed bureaucracy and balkanized responsibilities within the Executive branch lead directly to the lack of a unified effort and accountability found in repeated government reviews and reports. 21 Moving Stability and Reconstruction into the Next Century
Since the onset of host nation security force partnering and capacity building in Afghanistan and Iraq, the landscape has changed significantly for US rule of law reform assistance. Despite the maze that is development policy and funding amongst US government stakeholders, DoD now implements one-fifth of the US total development and foreign aid budgets. 22 A subsequent and unexpected result of this alignment is that as DoD is improving its coordination efforts, it is demonstrating the inherent value of the military's potential role in applying soft power or directly supporting other government agencies that are doing so. In November 2007 Secretary Gates alluded to this success and that perhaps the time to repeal Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act had come.
In the past, U.S. efforts to train foreign security forces have been burdened by outdated restrictions. In Afghanistan, for example, building up the Afghan army was harmfully delayed because there was no such category in the U.S. federal budget at the time, and we lacked the authorities and the resources to do so for a period. Other painful delays in training the Afghan and Iraqi police forces were the result of the fact that it was the responsibility of others and not the Department of Defense, and we were prohibited from participating in training police in the early period. Expanding the role of DoD's authority to partner and conduct rule of law capacity building operations has two inherent problems. First, it further complicates the system of development coordination and funding that has emerged within the government. Today more than fifty agencies and organizations operate US foreign assistance programs across a widely assembled array of legislative authorizations. One of the clear pitfalls in the current US system is that it renders impossible the ability of DoS to unify efforts across all agencies, manage and optimize the funding, synchronize these efforts to the mutual benefit of all, and most importantly to the benefit of the host country. 26 Second, as DoD continues to orchestrate the nation-building efforts of the two wars, how this will influence future reconstruction policy and planning is unclear. Today there is little evidence that policy is adapting to incorporate the successes that these rule of law foreign assistance and reform programs are now realizing. This is creating a gap in the important link between the strategic policy and how it is applied in practice.
As the reconstruction efforts continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, the templates for how US government agencies, international coalition partners, and supporting non-governmental organizations are being unified toward a broad purpose. 27 The impact of military involvement, particularly on the scale of the two ongoing reconstruction efforts, is a precedent that will be hard to ignore in the future. Recent testimony by the Special Inspection General for Iraq Reconstruction to Congress concludes that these new relationships, forged in the largest and most expensive 28 reconstruction effort in US history, are reshaping how the government must address future SRO endeavors with regard to rule of law reform:
In the area of police training, prudent practice should require all programs to be closely linked to a comprehensive Rule of Law strategic plan.
Handing out guns, building new facilities, and putting people through several weeks of basic training, outside the purview of a coherent Rule of law strategy, will not bring sustainable stability. This axiom militates in favor of a unified management system so that the expertise of the Department of Justice, the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, and Defense's recently developed stabilization capacity are brought to bear in an integrated fashion that embraces the building of capacity in court systems, laws, prisons, and police forces. Piecemeal approaches will not solve systemic problems. Programs should be designed in a way that can achieve results within SRO environmentsbased on an understanding of the culture, capabilities, and capacity of the host country.
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It is a wartime alliance to be sure and does little to solve the policy confusion in Clearly rule of law is not the only sector of development that is vital to good governance, but it is worthy of key policy emphasis. Consequently, it is no coincidence that the largest of the five key skill sets of the O/CRS civilian response corps is dedicated to security and rule of law operations. Rule of law capacity building cuts across the functions and organizations within both the security and justice sectors. As an end state to successful stability operations, 44 planning considerations primarily focus on legal framework and court reform, access to justice, and police and corrections reform operations. Because police reform is a critical function to both civil security and civil control capacities, it can be viewed as both creating the constabulary, stability capacities necessary to perform civil security and developing the community law enforcement capacities that support justice sector reform.
In support of Rule of law justice sector development programs, DoD has the organic capabilities to partner, and to a limited degree, advise 45 has the economic and political capacity to lead them on a scale equal to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed US capability, and to a greater extent political will, toward participating in these costly commitments may be waning with the fiscal constraints it faces for the foreseeable future.
As these developing nations continue to work toward increased capacities of governance, a growing role for Rule of law partnership initiatives during GCC phase zero operations seems clear. As a result, DoD should foster the capability of its rule of law functional practitioners to continue to develop these critical partnership and advisory skills by creating expeditionary, scalable partnering capabilities that support DoS and GCC security cooperation priorities.
Recommendations
In order to realize the partnering capacities for rule of law development participation by DoD entities discussed here, there are doctrinal and policy considerations and barriers that must be considered and addressed. These recommendations are limited to the considerations discussed in this paper, and do not attempt to categorize the comprehensive list of associated interagency operational and policy issues. Create effective US assistance programs to police and military forces to help governments develop the ability to secure their territories and protect their populations, by revisiting the excessively rigid regulatory framework for these assistance programs and improving their quality and coordination…In the short term, the US agenda should be to help build infrastructure to fight terrorism and other illicit networks, in exchange for progress toward genuine accountability and civilian oversight of security forces. In the long term, the United States must revisit its own capabilities and regulatory framework in order to facilitate investments in securitysector reform that build the overall capacity of militaries and security services, while taking care to increase their legitimacy and accountability to the citizens they serve.
Congress should amend the restrictions to US participation in foreign police
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In 2004 this recommendation was both timely and prudent. The US effort in police reform -and on a smaller scale courts and prisons -through the years that followed demonstrates the value of this capability to reconstruction end states that the report suggests. These missions were within statutory limits because of a post-conflict exemption in the law. But they clearly demonstrate the potential effects that can be achieved in security and justice sector development program goals. The government should amend the law to provide this capability for consideration in both international development and TSCP policy option planning. 50 the inability of civilian police agencies to fill CIVPOL capacity requirements, and the inability of military police units to effectively advise on civilian community policing principles. 51 The desired end sates end states of these studies for rule of law capacity, particularly in the area of police reform, can be realized by the use of this interagency task force concept. When not acting as the lead agency, DoD has abundant capacity to provide functional, expeditionary organizations that are task organized specifically to perform rule of law partnership and reform operations. 
Conclusion
There is little dispute to the assertion by many that the future global security environment will be, at a minimum, equally challenging to the US and its allies. Failed and failing states, and those emerging from conflict, will continue to have strong regional security implications and impact vital US interests. Other transnational threats and actors will have growing influence on global economic and security affairs in a time when the economic capacity of the US will be tied to domestic fiscal priorities. Nations will become increasingly reliant on the ability of their governments to provide for external and internal security of populations, resources and infrastructure. As a foundational concept of good governance, rule of law development and reform must be a key component of a nation's development goals to set the conditions for development in other sectors of governance.
As US policy looks to address these future security challenges, so too must it consider, where appropriate and prudent, early rule of law reform efforts in at-risk nations. By eliminating the statutory barriers to US government participation in these activities, appropriate agencies are free to develop programs that address directly the challenges of ineffective, corrupt, or nonexistent courts, police, and prison functions of the government. When considered holistically with border, customs, and other specialty functions of the security and justice apparatus, comprehensive development and reform assistance can finally be considered by the combined capacities of the US interagency.
Finally, the shared lessons and progress between DoD and DoS with regard to the planning, coordination, and execution of stability operations cannot be lost at the conclusion of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an expected time of limited appropriation and resources, DoD participation in, specifically, the security and justice sector initiatives discussed here will be difficult, but ultimately prudent and can be made to work to the mutual benefit of all parties. These two agencies especially, and jointly with other interagency stakeholders, must carry forward the hard lessons of cooperation and coordination of effort between them to better prepare for the next threats to US security that surely await us.
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